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The social life of self-injury: exploring the
communicative dimension of a very personal practice
Peter Steggals1 , Steph Lawler2 and Ruth Graham1
1School of Geography, Politics and Sociology (Sociology), Newcastle University, Newcastle
upon Tyne UK
2Department of Sociology, University of York, Wentworth College, York UK
Abstract This article makes the case for a sociological focus on the communicative,
relational and interactional dimensions of nonsuicidal self-injury. While current
research tends to be dominated by highly individual and intrapsychic models, it is
increasingly observed that such models leave a social dimension to the practice
unexplained. A burgeoning sociological literature has begun to address this
paradox of the social in self-injury; however, we argue that the role of the social
must be considered beyond the issues of aetiology, social learning and social
construal/construction that are typically covered in this literature. Speciﬁcally, we
argue that, since the lived meanings of self-injury directly implicate the
interactional along with the intrapsychic, a more systematic focus on the role of
social relations and social communication is vital. To illustrate this conceptual
argument and embed it in the lived experiences of self-injury, we draw on two
case studies taken from pilot research conducted by the authors. The more
thoroughly sociological approach to self-injury that we present here offers an
important compliment to the existing evidence base by reframing the absent
presence of social communication contained within it, and suggesting important
future directions for research.
Keywords: nonsuicidal self-injury, self-harm, social interaction, sociology
Introduction
Nonsuicidal self-injury has long been thought of as a peculiarly enigmatic practice (Muehlen-
kamp et al. 2012), something ‘confused and confusing’ to use Pierce’s memorably resigned
phrasing (1977: 377). A key aspect of this ambiguity centres on the way that social and com-
municative elements persistently haunt what is otherwise considered an intensely private matter
(Chandler 2016, Chandler et al. 2011, McShane 2012, Steggals 2015). Descriptions of self-
injury as a ‘form of violent communication’ (Grocutt 2009: 105), a ‘system of signs marking
statements about the self’ (Gardner 2001: 4) and a ‘language of blood and pain’ (Hewitt 1997:
58) voicing ‘things that cannot be [otherwise] said’ (Pembroke 1996: 45) are quite common
(our emphasis throughout). But these descriptions exist in a pronounced and unresolved ten-
sion with the dominant models of self-injury that typically frame it as a wholly and claustro-
phobically personal crisis; something completely ‘inner’ and therefore not ‘outer’, something
individual and therefore not social and something private and therefore not interactional
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(Chandler 2016, Chandler et al. 2011, Steggals 2015). We call this tension the paradox of the
social in self-injury.
Recently, the dominance of this wholly intrapsychic and individualistic framing of self-
injury has been challenged by sociological and historical work that has produced important
insights into its social aetiology, social learning and social construal/construction (Adler
and Adler 2007, 2008, 2011, 2012, Brossard 2014, Chandler 2012, 2013, 2014, 2016,
Chandler et al. 2011, 2016, Chaney 2017, Frost 2001, Hodgson 2004, Inckle 2007, 2014,
Kilby 2001, McShane 2012, Millard 2015, Steggals 2015). However, while this work has
helped to ﬁll in the social background to self-injury, nonetheless, much like the dominant
models it critically engages with, it still tends to foreground the ﬁgure of the psychoso-
cially isolated and uncommunicative individual. Meanwhile, the paradox of the social in
self-injury suggests directly social communicative, interactional and even relational
dimensions to self-injury. As such, we argue that the implication of the paradox is that
our understanding of self-injury will always be necessarily partial as long as we restrict
ourselves to this ﬁgure of the uncommunicative individual. In order to develop a fuller
understanding of self-injury, it is vital that we explore its social communicative
dimensions.
The relative neglect of this aspect of self-injury (Muehlenkamp et al. 2012: 67–8) may in
part be due to a lack of sociological imagination in the psy-centric paradigms that dominate
research. But another factor that has strongly militated against this kind of research (including
sociological work) is a common concern that suggesting self-injury is in any way relational is
tantamount to dismissing it as ‘attention-seeking’; a pejorative phrase implying an illegitimate
and histrionic social manipulation (Chandler 2016, Pembroke 1996). As we discuss later, self-
injury is frequently assumed to only be authentic when it is non-communicative. Part of our
task then, is to think about how self-injury can be both an intensely personal practice and
something that is suffused with social processes; an authentic expression of genuine distress,
while at the same time something intertwined with, and not separate from, the interaction order
(Goffman 1983). As such, we argue in this article that self-injury requires, in the words of
Goffman’s deeply relevant study of stigma, a ‘language of relationships, not attributes’ (1968:
13).
To make our case, we begin by surveying the status of the social in existing theory and
research and establish the social communicative as a kind of absent presence within this work.
In our second section, we examine the issue of ‘attention-seeking’ as the primary obstacle to
further research on social communication in self-injury, and we explore the issues of visibility
(Chandler 2016: 109–44) and recognition (Frank 1991: 87, Fraser and Honneth 2003) which,
while often underdeveloped in self-injury research, represent promising ways into a more inter-
actional and relational approach.
While ours is an exploratory article, intended to review the existing evidence base and
develop from it suggestions for new directions in research, the lived reality of self-injury is
always personal, situated and intimately tied to narrative and experience (McShane 2012). As
such, sections three and four draw on two complementary case studies to illustrate our argu-
ment and contextualise it within the details of actual lived experience. These case studies are
drawn from a 2016–2017 English pilot study carried out by the authors. The study explored
the degree to which signiﬁcant relationships shape people’s practices and experiences of self-
injury, even as these relationships are themselves affected and shaped by self-injury. Following
Klonsky and Muehlenkamp’s claim that an individual might self-injure to elicit responses from
a signiﬁcant other and yet not be ‘fully aware that their self-injury is encouraged or reinforced
by its effects on [these] others’ (2007: 1050), our pilot study gathered data from 26 in-depth
semi-structured qualitative interviews (20 with female participants, and 6 with male) conducted
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not just with people who self-injure (n = 9) but also those in a variety of relationships with
people who self-injure (n = 12), and those who have had both experiences (n = 6). In this
way, we were better positioned to understand the interaction between self-injury and the rela-
tionships that constitute its immediate social context.
It is important to emphasise that our purpose in this article is more theoretical than empiri-
cal. Our case studies are not intended to empirically establish our argument but rather help
illustrate how a focus on relationships, interaction and communication has the potential to
reframe our understanding and productively shape further research into the lived experience of
self-injury. We hope this theoretical article, using empirical examples for illustration, will
demonstrate the value of the concepts that have informed our pilot study. And with this
demonstration of concept established, we will provide a complete report on the empirical ﬁnd-
ings of our pilot study elsewhere.
Ultimately, we argue that we must reposition existing individualistic understandings of self-
injury within a broader social framework including a social communicative dimension. Chal-
lenging the prejudice of ‘attention-seeking’ is important in itself as part of reducing the stigma
experienced by people who self-injure. But this challenge also helps us to explore how a
broader framework could facilitate the development of alternative perspectives on self-injury,
and new avenues for sociological research.
Violent communication
In her 1996 piece, Maggy Ross provides an interesting example of the paradox of the social in
self-injury:
I know why I self-injure. I do it at times of extreme emotion: anger, self-hatred, stress, grief
and guilt. I do it to punish myself. When I feel I am losing control, I reach for a razor and
prove to myself that I can, at least, have control over my body . . . The cuts are a visual
expression of my distress. When I am lost for words, my cuts speak for me. They say –
look – this is how much I’m hurting inside (1996: 13)
In the ﬁrst part of this testimony, Ross provides a powerful but familiar description of trou-
bling emotions and psychological motives, with an emphasis on the intrapsychic nature of
self-injury in stating that she reaches for a razor to ‘prove to myself that I . . . have control’
(our emphasis). But in the second part, her explanation becomes subtly less individual and
intrapsychic in its language: her cuts are a ‘visual expression’ that ‘speak’ for her. What does
it mean to think of this private act as an inherently communicative one? And if Ross’ self-
injury does indeed say ‘look – this is how much I’m hurting inside’ then who, on the outside,
is this expression intended to reach? Whose gaze would recognise the ‘language of blood and
pain’ and therefore understand and validate Ross’ expression of her inner state?
As already noted, such descriptions are not uncommon. Indeed, the social has always been
something of an absent presence in self-injury research. For example, with respect to aetiology,
there is a well-attested ‘role of pathological family relationships, parent–child discord and dis-
rupted bonding in the risk of self-harm’ (Gratz 2006: 239). Self-injury has also been positively
correlated with knowing other people who self-injure (Hawton et al. 2006); a fact that has led
to models of social learning (Hodgson 2004, Prinstein et al. 2009) and concerns over possible
social ‘contagion’ within institutional settings (Crouch and Wright 2004) and through media
exposure (Whitlock et al. 2009). Studies of social aetiology and social learning make an
important contribution to understandings, but tend to leave the core intrapsychic model of self-
injury intact, and as such, the social paradox of self-injury unresolved.
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Building on these understandings, sociological work has contributed fuller, more sophisti-
cated accounts of self-injury in terms of sociocultural processes. Naturally these attempts have
varied. At one end of the scale, for example, in Adler and Adler’s work (2007, 2008, 2011),
an emphasis on processes of social construal essentially maintains the intrapsychic model but
argues that self-injury can be framed and articulated in different ways as public understandings
and representations change and develop. At the other end of the scale, for example, in Steg-
gals’ work (2015), there is more emphasis on social construction, and the idea of self-injury
as a kind of symbolic practice or ‘idiom’ of disorder. Here, self-injury is conceptualised as a
culturally pre-packaged pattern of meanings and actions that shapes and directs people’s expe-
riences and expressions of distress and social estrangement.
Other sociological work falling between these positions has focused on the narrative and
phenomenological dimensions of experience (Chandler 2014, 2016, McShane 2012), or on pat-
terns of individual practice (Brossard 2014). But again, this sociological work, while certainly
developing our understanding of self-injury in important ways, maintains a basic similarity to
psy-centric approaches and so fails to resolve the social paradox. Although taking different
roads to get there, both psy and sociological perspectives converge on the image of a painfully
isolated individual, alone behind their bedroom door, cutting themselves in secret and with lit-
tle thought for social communication of any kind.
This conceptualisation is perhaps not surprising. Self-injury is intensely personal; it is
almost always conducted in private and frequently expresses feelings of social isolation (Smith
et al. 1998, Solomon and Farrand 1996). But our suggestion here is not that this familiar con-
ceptualisation is wrong, so much as it is partial and limiting. Ross’ passage, for example,
invokes a powerfully expressive aspect, although not directly communicative and interactional.
Indeed, self-injury is often described through an expressive logic as a kind of symbolic exter-
nalisation; a showing, or making physical – making ‘real’ – a non-physical and inner pain
(Chandler 2016: 117, Steggals 2015: 89–96). People who self-injure often question the validity
of their inner experience, worrying that it does not describe real pain so much as reﬂect a nar-
cissistic or histrionic defect of character. Expressing invisible inner pain as a visible bodily
wound then, while acting as an emotional release, also provides a validation or authentication
by drawing on the symbolic association of embodiment with the ‘real’ (Bendelow 2009). As
Susan Kaysen, the author of Girl, Interrupted, puts it
I was trying to explain my situation to myself. My situation was that I was in pain and
nobody knew it, even I had trouble knowing it . . . It [self-injury] was the only way I could
get through to myself . . . I was demonstrating, externally and irrefutably, an inward condi-
tion (2000: 153, our emphasis).
In this imperative, to show we encounter self-injury as a kind of desperate bodily speech act,
and uncover the core questions of the social paradox: does such an expressive action necessar-
ily aim at social communication? If, by this recourse to the ﬂesh, self-injury is supposed to
make a deﬁnitive statement, and so authenticate a particular kind of experience and identity, is
it enough for it to be witnessed only by the person who self-injures? Or is it something that
ultimately (even if only ideally) seeks the validation of an-other?
Certainly, Babiker and Arnold have argued that self-injury is a form of self-communication;
that ‘[a]n individual may feel self-injury to be a form of testimony; a way of being true to
themselves and honouring their own experience [of past trauma]’ (1997: 79). And as Bartky
notes in relation to feelings of shame: ‘I can become an object for myself; I can see myself as
I might be seen by another, caught in a shameful act . . . the Other before whom I am shamed
is only – myself’ (Bartky 1990: 85). But personal sentiments and the claims they make ‘are
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never quite real until they are exposed to the reaction of others and tested for truth and legiti-
macy in symbolic communication’ (Callero 2009: 51). A testimony is never fully a testimony
until it has had its day in a public court. Self-communication may be important then, but it
may also be a partial position; a compromise between the desire to be ‘tested for truth and
legitimacy’ on the one hand (self-injury being recognised then, as a legitimate and legitimating
testimony), and the fear of being found illegitimate and ‘attention-seeking’ on the other.
In fact, there is ample evidence that the communicative dimension of self-injury is, at least
in part, something more than just self-communication (Brown et al. 2002, Rodham et al.
2004, Turner et al. 2012). Nock and Prinstein (2004, 2005), for example, have argued that
some self-injury may represent a strategy for eliciting responses from others and for managing
the social environment. Later work by Nock has argued that in many but not all cases, self-
injury may serve as a ‘high intensity social signal’ (2008: 159) where other possible types of
communication or signalling (talking, yelling, crying) have not worked. This could happen
where the signal is not strong, and the person who self-injures has struggled with effective ver-
bal communication, or in situations where the signal is poorly ‘detected’, perhaps because it is
drowned out by the general communicative and affective noise of the social environment.
The possibility that self-injury may serve interpersonal, interactional and intrapsychic func-
tions, is evident in Hawton et al.’s (2006) schools study, which used a list of eight core motives
to elicit participants’ reasons for ‘self-harm’ (here implying both self-injury and attempted sui-
cide). While 72.8% of respondents identiﬁed intrapersonal motives, such as getting ‘relief from a
terrible state of mind’, a signiﬁcant minority identiﬁed more overtly interpersonal motives. These
included ‘I wanted someone to know how desperate I was feeling’ (40.7%); ‘I wanted to ﬁnd out
whether someone really loved me’ (31.3%); ‘I wanted to get some attention’ (24%); ‘I wanted to
frighten someone’ (21.1%) and ‘I wanted to get my own back on someone’ (14.3%) (2006: 55).
Likewise, Spandler (1996) lists numerous core assertions made by her participants which express
interpersonal and even interactional sentiments such as ‘I want someone to listen but I can’t tell
anyone’, ‘I want to talk about it but it’s all about not being able to say anything and about there
being no words for it’, ‘I want attention but I’m not worthy of it’, ‘I want people to notice and
care but I hide it’ and ‘I want to approach people, ask for help, but that’s a really hard thing to do
and I can’t guarantee it’ll help’ (1996: 103–4).
This evidence supports a conceptualisation of self-injury as involving a subtle and complex
underlay of social and communicative, relational and interactional functions. Such a conceptu-
alisation invites further exploration to enhance knowledge in this important area. Adding to
sociological work on processes of social construal and social construction, this enhanced focus
on social communication may be pivotal in dissolving the social paradox of self-injury. How-
ever, though the observation of this underlay is well documented (Feldman 1988, Klonsky and
Muehlenkamp 2007, Nock and Prinstein 2004, Prinstein et al. 2009, Walsh and Rosen 1988),
robust examination of its implications has been lacking. This may be because such questions
are more sociological than psychological, but it may also reﬂect an (over)sensitivity to the
potential for such conceptualisation to stray into accusations of ‘attention-seeking’ (Chandler
2016).
Attention-seeking, recognition and visibility
The phrase ‘attention-seeking’ has negative and histrionic connotations, implying an unwar-
ranted method for extracting kindness, sympathy and the beneﬁts of the ‘sick role’ (Parsons
1951). Indeed, some of these connotations connect self-injury with the historical idiom and
discourse of hysteria in a complex and contested genealogy of personal distress and social
© 2019 The Authors. Sociology of Health & Illness published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of Foundation for SHIL.
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discrimination (Steggals 2015: 33–5). Like hysteria, self-injury is culturally coded as being
essentially feminine regardless of the biological sex or gender identity of the person self-injur-
ing (ibid.). And just as ‘attention seeking’ has been applied as an unrestricted generalisation
enabling dismissive views on self-injury (Crouch and Wright 2004), the same can be said for
young women in general, who constitute both the biggest demographic group of people who
self-injure, as well as the popular stereotype of ‘the self-harmer’. But as Louise Pembroke
counters with considerable power:
What is attention-seeking? I know that I do not seek the degradation I have received in
Accident and Emergency, neither do I want to be treated with sympathy nor pity . . . If I
wanted ‘attention’ in an exhibitionist way, it would be much easier and pain-free to walk
into the middle of the street and remove my clothes. I would not need to cut up my body’
(1996: 44-45)
Most user groups, such as the National Self-harm Network and Self-injury Support, and many
writers (McAllister 2003) regard the idea of attention-seeking as a pernicious myth. As Pem-
broke suggests, the implicit moral assessment of the phrase ‘attention-seeking’ invokes conno-
tations of psychological weakness and dependency, mixed with a fraudulent and selﬁsh social
manipulation. The resulting sensitisation to any suggestion that self-injury is anything but
wholly individual, secret and private is understandable in this context. Indeed, many see the
privacy of the practice as the guarantor of its authenticity (Chandler 2016), with non-private
elements leading to categorisation as inauthentic and attention-seeking (Scourﬁeld et al. 2011).
If self-injury is in part then, as we have suggested, an attempt to communicate and hence au-
thenticate a particular kind of inner experience, it is peculiarly frustrated by the fact that any
such communication can all-too-easily be read as evidence that no ‘real’, authentic – and
hence authenticating – self-injury has occurred.
Still, as Chandler has noted ‘[s]cratch the surface, and the idea of ‘private’ self-injury
becomes contested: private to who, secret from who?’ (2016: 197–98). Reversing the standard
framing, she suggests that ‘the continued valorisation of privacy and secrecy maintains a cul-
tural account where self-injury is viewed as private, secret, and therefore visible self-injury is
subject to negative readings: “manipulation”, “attention-seeking” – “inauthentic”’ (2016: 198,
her emphasis). So, while self-injury – or at least a claim to it – as a kind of social manipula-
tion is conceivable (and the status it now carries in the public imagination does make it avail-
able for multiple aesthetic or identity projects) it nonetheless seems likely that if someone is
willing to mutilate themselves then they are probably motivated by a signiﬁcant felt need,
regardless of how secret they keep their injury.
Pembroke also reframes the issue, arguing: ‘if “attention” means being listened to and taken
seriously, then along with the rest of the human race I’m attention-seeking’ (1996: 44–5). She
continues ‘consideration should be given to what attention [a person who self-injures] . . .
needs’. For some people self-harm is a form of communication to voice things that cannot be
said (1996: 45). Testimony from Spandler’s study supports this interpretation:
I just wanted someone to listen . . . [but] no-one really knew about it because I hid it . . . All
I wanted was someone to listen, to be taken away from the situation, someone to notice
without me having to tell them. You need attention – there’s something drastically wrong
but you can’t actually say to anyone ‘look I need your help’ so you tell in another way
(1996: 105-6)
Far from implying histrionics then, ‘attention’ could be something that, as one participant from
Steggals’ study describes it, exists between ‘the desire for self-effacement and the desire, not
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to be looked at exactly, but just to be recognised’ (2015: 160, our emphasis). Recognition has
more usually been considered in terms of claims to be considered a full and worthwhile mem-
ber of a polity (Fraser and Honneth 2003; also Lawler 2005). But while one set of claims to
be taken seriously may be made on the basis of citizenship, and another set of claims may be
made, as here, on the experience of authentic and authenticating distress, there is a sense in
which both cases imply a deeper demand: that the subject be recognised, as Arthur Frank puts
it in his discussion on recognition, ‘as fully human’ (1991: 87). As one person put it to
Hewitt: ‘[c]utting seems to be a great self-destructive attempt to become human. To gain
recognition, to prove to someone that I matter, and that I bleed too’ (1997: 57).
Self-injury then, rather than being attention-seeking in the pejorative sense, is better under-
stood as containing a powerful and desperate self-communicative and social communicative
imperative; and it may in fact be attention, as recognition, which is desired and demanded
(Crouch and Wright 2004). The complication is that this desire is likely to be frustrated in
contexts where obviously communicated self-injury is misinterpreted as evidence of inauthen-
ticity. Under such conditions self-injury can become, as Steggals notes
like a letter that has been written but not sent, set aside in a safe place with the possibility
that it may be sent in the future and with the hope that by then the recipient will be able to
understand it, to recognise the truths that it contains . . . The writing of this letter, of inscrib-
ing ‘please help me’ onto the body, would seem in and of itself to often be enough, at least
for the immediate psychological needs of the person (2015: 160)
This may be true, but it is also true that the letter, even if it is kept hidden for a while, does
seem to have a habit of being at least shared, and perhaps even delivered. Most self-injury
does not remain strictly secret (Muehlenkamp et al. 2012) but becomes subject to a complex
and ambiguous play of revealing and concealing, or what Chandler calls ‘visibility’ (Chandler
2016: 109–44). The underlying logic of this process is that an act of showing enables commu-
nication, but works only because it is not framed as a deliberate act of communication or
‘attention-seeking’ (i.e. it shows, but it is not seen to show).
Most forms of self-injury leave marks on the skin, which already endangers secrecy through
their potential visibility. In addition, self-injury is often enacted ambiguously across the bor-
ders of the inner/outer divide, sensitising the public/private boundary. Brossard (2014) for
example, talks about ‘virtual opportunities to “seek help”’ (2014: 568) where those about to
self-injure stage imaginary social scenes in which their intentions are disclosed in the hope of
eliciting understanding and even intervention. He reports that some of his participants might
go to the supermarket to buy razorblades, hoping that the cashier would realise what they were
doing and intervene (ibid). We could add other examples: using unconvincing explanations for
visible scars (an infamous example being: ‘the cat did it’); leaving bloody clothes in a shared
laundry basket; leaving out blood-stained tissues and towels; inadequately hiding self-injury
kits; seeking medical attention for physically superﬁcial wounds; injuring oneself in public
restrooms; wearing clothes that reveal scars; or, conversely, hiding scars in highly conspicuous
ways such as under heavy, long-sleeved clothing on hot summer days. Chandler talks about
how she maintained a ‘self-narrative that I had ‘always’ kept my self-injury secret’ nonethe-
less:
[a]t one point, in my mid-teens, I had cut my face and hand – injuries that were inevitably
seen by others. Further, throughout the time I injured myself, the wounds would be
‘revealed’ on occasion, sleeves would ride up my arm, people noticed, stories of explanation
had to be provided, cats were blamed (2016: 134)
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She concludes that although ‘I had been clear my injuries were never about ‘attention-seeking’
– they nonetheless did attract ‘attention’ and were not always ‘hidden’’ (2016: 134). In addi-
tion to such examples, it should also be noted that many people who self-injure participate in
digitally mediated communities in which they may publicly discuss and even display their
self-injury (Adler and Adler 2008, Whitlock et al. 2009). The presence of self-injury–related
content on social media platforms is of course a controversial and contested issue, as high-
lighted by the recent Instagram ban on self-injury images (Chandler 2019), but it is also a use-
ful reminder that this personal practice can include a deﬁnite public dimension.
These twin issues of recognition and visibility then, while present as observations in
research ﬁndings, are largely absent from explanatory models of self-injury. Together these
concepts help demonstrate that self-injury is a complex area of social practice that works
across and between the borders of the inner/outer and private/public distinction, and even the
intentional/unintentional. The social politics of recognition, and the play of visibility, suggest
that ambiguity and ambivalence play a critical role in how self-injury is conceptualised and
undertaken. Revealing and concealing do not form a discrete binary choice (Chandler 2016),
but rather represent two poles in personal dilemmas where agency and action take on a con-
fused and confusing indeterminacy. We argue that self-injury undermines the strict demarca-
tion of the psychological from the sociological, and indeed undermined any straightforward
inside/outside dichotomy. Self-injury is a personal act, yet simultaneously a part of a person’s
relational life and interwoven with the interaction order: that domain of virtual or actual co-
presence, structured by social rules that are largely unthinkingly observed (Goffman 1983).
Self-injury is therefore a rich resource for sociological investigation, if we approach it as
something occurring within, and having effects across, networks of relationships.
To illustrate this key argument and the themes that support it, we utilise here two case stud-
ies. These case studies help to demonstrate the need for a sociology of the social communica-
tive dimension of self-injury, and to contextualise our theoretical discussion in the context of
lived experience. Here, we shall brieﬂy examine the case of Debra, a 23-year-old woman who
reports self-injuring between the ages of 12 and 15, and then again from 18 to 22; and that of
Rachel, a 47-year-old school nurse, and the mother of two daughters, the younger one of
whom, Mia, has a history of self-injury that began when she was 13 or 14 years old (these
case studies have been anonymised). These two particular cases have been selected because,
while Debra and Rachel are unacquainted, their cases mirror and reﬂect one another from both
sides of self-injury’s social equation: Debra as a young teenager beginning to self-injure, and
Rachel as the concerned mother of a young teenager who is self-injuring. Of course, real cases
are always multi-dimensional, the product of a complex interaction of factors, with many pos-
sible aspects that could be explored further. However, our interest here is strictly illustrative:
to show how the argument we have developed here, through a critical engagement with exist-
ing research, has signiﬁcant potential to inform a more nuanced analysis of lived experiences.
Case Study 1: Debra
For Debra, her self-injury is ‘deﬁnitely tied into’ her relationships. She describes three close
relationships that produced emotions that were both strong and frightening to her. They were
emotions that she struggled to ‘process’, threatening to overwhelm her sense of self-control
and even her sense of individual selfhood. The emotional product of these relationships was
often anger, which she controlled through acts of self-injury, although other factors were also
important, including ‘the big questions’ about what she will do with her life, and the sense of
being ‘lost’ that comes with not knowing the answer. Her self-injury began at school and was
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especially connected with her ‘obsessive’ and troubled relationship with her best friend who
also self-injured. A period of little or no self-injury between the ages of 15 and 18 was initi-
ated by her breaking off this relationship. She began self-injuring again when she went to uni-
versity, following a short intimate relationship which she reports ‘did not go well at all and
kind of damaged my self-esteem’, and continued through a longer intimate relationship that
had ended a year before her interview.
When Debra ﬁrst began to self-injure, she tellingly tried to keep it a secret from everyone
but her best friend. ‘I wanted her to see’ she explains
But I was hoping as well that it would bring us closer together or, or something . . . or just
to get attention from her I guess or, um, yeah, some kind of affection. Yeah, it was strange
that it was sort of a way that we used, we used it as a way to get affection from people; so,
we wanted people to feel sorry for us . . . [just] so they know that you’re suffering I guess
. . . It’s a wordless way of showing that you’re not okay.
Debra’s wonderfully neat description of self-injury as ‘a wordless way of showing’, highlights
the social communicative function that lies behind it. In response to the question ‘what’s
wrong with words?’ Debra describes what Kilby (2001) has called the ‘failed promise of lan-
guage’, the sense of being unable to articulate, and as such understand, feelings in the terms
provided by conventional language. She traces this to her childhood, and explains that, follow-
ing the death of her mother’s partner: ‘I kind of went through this trying-not-to-show-any-
emotions phase’.
Steggals: Yeah, was that sort of being strong for your mum or . . . ?
Debra: Yes, I think so, because a lot of people told me in that period that that’s what
I should be. Um, and that I should look after her and stuff and I kind of,
yeah, I guess I took that on at nine-years-old which then led to not being able
to deal with emotions later in life . . . on our whole, er, mum’s side of the
family it’s very um, not talking about emotions. That’s always been quite a
big thing and even now, like, we don’t talk about things that involve emotions
and I guess that fed in, in a way, to my not being able to process emotions,
and that’s what potentially led me to er, use, yeah, harming as a way of
feeling something.
Arthur Frank (1991), in describing the ‘communicative body’, explains that when ordinary lan-
guage fails in this way, it is typically the body that ‘breaks out of [the] codes’ that have
silenced the subject, seeking instead to ‘ﬁnd self-expression in a code of its own invention’
(1991: 85). Or, as Hewitt puts it: ‘gesture replaces language. What cannot be said in words
becomes the language of blood and pain’ (1997: 58): a wordless way of showing. Certainly,
what is being shown here is a testimony of suffering, of what Debra feels is her authentic
inner truth. But interestingly, in the context of talking about one of her later intimate relation-
ship, the purpose of this showing appears to go beyond recognition alone, and implies recogni-
tion in service to a social and emotional bond.
Steggals: But you were saying about showing somebody the depth or strength of your
feeling as well; is part of it wanting him to see, in a way, what he had done
to you or how much you felt?
Debra: Yeah, and, yeah; how I was hurting. Um, I guess, I don’t know if to a rational
person that, like now I know that that’s not something that’s ever going to
work to make somebody love you, but I guess as an irrational person, um,
you kind of do anything don’t you?
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Both this later intimate relationship, and her earlier intense relationship with her best friend
then (as well as Debra’s understanding of her best friend’s own self-injury), were characterised
by experiences of self-injury focused on eliciting ‘some kind of affection’. This raises an inter-
esting question: is the desire for recognition not only about a sense of self-validation but also
the particular person you want validation from? Could this desire, and the sharing of the secret
of self-injury, serve to (re)negotiate and strengthen a social bond? To explore this further, we
turn to our second case study.
Case Study 2: Rachel and Mia
Rachel participated in an interview as the mother of Mia, who had a history of self-injury.
Mia’s self-injury was therefore described to Steggals by Rachel, who characterised it as part of
Mia’s broader pattern of unhappiness including depression, two suicide attempts, and a period
of food-refusal. Rachel was uncertain about what had caused this unhappiness, although she
said that Mia has always maintained that it was the product of peer bullying. Rachel’s account
certainly echoes the ‘failed promise of language’ as her earlier relationship with Mia disinte-
grated, and both communication and contact between them began to break down. Indeed, the
most striking element of Rachel’s story is how pronounced these issues of communication are,
as alternative forms of communication evolved to ﬁll the awkward social space that opened-up
between them. Mia’s self-injury is the obvious ﬁrst example, the recourse of Frank’s commu-
nicative body, mediated by the ambivalent and ambiguous displays of visuality noted earlier.
As Rachel tells the story of how she discovered her daughter’s self-injury:
She was lying in the garden with um, she got, she’d been upstairs, got changed and she’d
got a little strappy top on, and she’d got her arms behind her head, lying in the sun. And I
walked up to her and I thought ‘oh my gosh she’s got, you know, she’s got scarring down
her arms’ . . . She knew I’d clocked it, she’d know, but she’d obviously, she’d put a strappy
top on, so she must have known I was going to see that day . . . Um, so you know, whether
that, that element was, you know, she was ready to, to share that information with me I
guess.
But while Mia’s self-injury may have been known, it was not public: Rachel immediately
acted to keep the fact from her own mother, as well as Mia’s sister and father. The ideal poles
of secret and shared then, do not map perfectly onto the equally ideal poles of private and
public, and a shared secret is still a secret nonetheless. But even within the context of this
shared secret, communication between Mia and Rachel was not yet restored. Mia would not
speak directly about her issues with Rachel, although she did begin to send messages through
her CAMHS worker. And for her part, Rachel found that she could not speak about the
self-injury.
I couldn’t really say the words when I ﬁrst found out, I couldn’t use the word ‘self-harm’, I
couldn’t, or ‘hurt yourself’, or ‘cut yourself’; I couldn’t use those words, they couldn’t come
out of my mouth, they were too painful
The failure of language spread then, with the secret itself, from daughter to mother. But, in
time a new form of communication developed. Rachel, on the pretext of cleaning Mia’s room,
would search for hidden razor blades and would let Mia know what she had found. While
these items were hidden, the fact that Mia knew her mother was going into her room, taken
together with the fact that these items continued to be left there, raises some of the same issues
© 2019 The Authors. Sociology of Health & Illness published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of Foundation for SHIL.
10 Peter Steggals et al.
around ambiguous communication and visuality that Mia’s original display of her self-injury
also raised. Indeed, Mia told her CAMHS worker to tell Rachel where to ﬁnd some old suicide
notes that she had written. In this way, Mia’s bedroom became a kind of alternative bulletin
board in which things left, and things discovered allowed for some controlled and largely
wordless way of showing; an alternative mode of communication.
In time Rachel and Mia developed a more sophisticated ‘wordless way’ of communication
that Rachel refers to as ‘the code’:
So, she would send me, we had codes, so if she was going to cut at night she would send a
code on my, by text, to say she was feeling like she needed to cut. Um, and we had an
agreement at that point that, if she sent me that text, I’d go upstairs to her and, you know,
we’d try some strategies.
[W]e had a little code system for all of it. And we devised it together. So, it was ‘sad face’
if she was thinking about self-harm, or, you know, it was a kiss, an ‘X’ if it was something
else. And we, it was a Morse, it was almost like a Morse code.
This code, delivered by text or by leaving notes on the kitchen table, provided different sym-
bols, resulting in different prearranged responses and strategies. This brilliantly provided them
with a wordless form of communication and coordination that circumvented the issues that
had come to weigh down ordinary language. As Rachel explains:
I couldn’t say the words, I couldn’t say the words and I couldn’t talk about it . . . these
words are really hard to say out loud, and if I can’t say them, you may not be able to say
them either.
Over time the code allowed Rachel to feel a new conﬁdence in her relationship with her
daughter, and even helped Mia to stop self-injuring. As Rachel explains this, she says that
people who self-injure ‘can’t express [their feelings] in words and [their self-injury is] a strat-
egy they’re using, so actually, we found a different strategy’.
Returning to the question we were left with at the end of Debra’s story, Rachel believes this
renegotiation of the social and emotional bond between her and Mia certainly did strengthen
their relationship:
it was almost really special. And I’d, I’d say that um, also, I actually felt I grew a lot closer
to her . . . I actually feel closer. There’s an ultimate bond there, now, or another bond, on
another level . . . I do feel that I, actually, again, the silver lining is that I did form a differ-
ent relationship, and a much more honest relationship.
Conclusion
Whilst illustrative case studies do not allow the same level of theoretical generalisation as an
inductive analysis of a broad data set, they do facilitate a more in-depth demonstration of the
conceptual argument we have presented; and thereby provide insight into how the analysis of
empirical data could be developed by reframing self-injury as – at least in part – an issue
of social communication. What Derbra and Rachel’s testimony illustrates – through the failure
of ordinary language, its replacement by the alternative semiotics of the communicative body
and the renegotiation of language (and relationships) through other forms of expression – is
that self-injury is intimately, although not exclusively, connected with issues of both self- and
social communication.
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The paradox of the social in self-injury then, is a tension that is likely produced more by how
we frame the practice than by anything inherently confused and confusing about self-injury. If
our ability to resolve the paradox is limited by the overly intrapsychic models that dominate our
thinking, then it is this way of modelling both self-injury and subjectivity that we must overcome.
The sociological literature has already begun this work, but the presence of social communication
in self-injury suggests that we need to go much further. We need to understand self-injury as
something that is not only social in its formation but also in its ongoing daily practice. But we
also need to disrupt the traditional Western model of subjectivity that informs the exclusively
intrapsychic paradigm (Chandler 2016, Steggals 2015). The monadic, self-sufﬁcient individual,
or homo clausus (Elias, 2000 [1939]), and the whole binary structure of inner/outer, individual/
social and private/public that goes with it (Callero 2009, Derrida 1982) must be reframed as pat-
terns of enacted and embodied values rather than as ontological givens.
As we have seen, one possible model to shape this further work would be Frank’s concept of
the ‘communicative body’ (1991), in which the body, contra homo clausus, is essentially ‘dya-
dic’, socially ‘contingent’ and ‘other-related’. Echoing Nock’s observations about ‘high intensity
social signals’, Frank argues that it is when narratives of silenced – which is to say, unrecognised
– selfhood, of vulnerability and suffering, ‘are spoken from . . . the body that they can be shared
most readily’ (1991: 89, our emphasis). Perhaps this is precisely because the language of the
body is, as we have seen, located ambiguously between intention and accident; between con-
scious (and hence deliberate) action, and unconscious (non-deliberate) symptom. There is anxiety
associated with the dilemma of disclosing oneself in the hope of recognition on the one hand, or
else concealing oneself to avoid a failure of recognition – and the rejection of self that this implies
– on the other. This anxiety may be partially managed by using a bodily strategy of expression
(self-injury) that is indeed communicative, but that falls short of being a fully deliberate, inten-
tional communication. Only further sociological research into the social communicative dimen-
sion of self-injury will improve our understanding. And such sociological work also carries clear
implications for practice, especially if it can be carried out in partnership with clinicians. Indeed,
a deeper understanding of the communicative dimension of self-injury will help inform clinical
approaches to care, such as integrating personal coping strategies with those based on people’s
available social support network. Such research is clearly needed. Whenever the body speaks it is
important, and however the body is speaking in self-injury, it seems clear what the message is:
I’m in pain, I matter, I deserve recognition.
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